Laplace Rising: The Story of How a Tiny Community in Southern Louisiana Will Save the Largest Delta in North America by Hudson, J. Robert
Sustainable Development Law & Policy
Volume 14 | Issue 1 Article 5
Laplace Rising: The Story of How a Tiny
Community in Southern Louisiana Will Save the
Largest Delta in North America
J. Robert Hudson
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/sdlp
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington College of Law Journals & Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ American
University Washington College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Sustainable Development Law & Policy by an authorized administrator of
Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law. For more information, please contact fbrown@wcl.american.edu.
Recommended Citation
Hudson, J. Robert. "Laplace Rising: The Story of How a Tiny Community in Southern Louisiana Will Save the Largest Delta in North
America." Sustainable Development Law & Policy 14, no. 1 (2014): 23-33, 67-68.
23Winter 2014
LapLace Rising: The sTory of hoW A TIny 
communITy In souThern louIsIAnA WIll sAve 
The lArGesT delTA In norTh AmerIcA
By J. Robert Hudson*
I. InTroducTIon
Laissez les bon temps rouler, they said. It was supposed to be an easy one: Category 2, at worst.1 Before Hurricane Isaac made landfall at the mouth of the Mississippi River 
on August 29, 2012, the people of Laplace, Louisiana, made 
preparations as they always have: duct-taped windows, filled 
sand bags, stocked up on bottled water and whiskey. The fore-
cast looked decent; nothing compared to the menace of Katrina, 
Rita, or Gustav.2 The generations-old tradition of hurricane par-
ties commenced without question. It then could only come as a 
shock when the streets of this city of thirty thousand people were 
suddenly deluged in water levels higher than those ever experi-
enced before: higher than Hurricane Katrina.3 In the days lead-
ing up to Hurricane Isaac’s landfall, the citizens of Laplace had 
little, if any, warning of the devastation that would ensue.4 There 
was no precedent—just brown lines left across dining room 
walls after Lake Pontchartrain receded.
Following the horror and multi-billion dollar onslaught 
of the 2005 hurricane season, the United States Army Corps 
of Engineers (“Corps” or “USACE”) was drowning under the 
weight of its failed levee system in New Orleans.5 Scenes of 
degenerates raiding electronics stores and refugees sleeping on 
highway overpasses were staples of every major news broadcast 
from New York to Shanghai.6 Some looters even saw the crimes 
as “an opportunity to get back at society.”7 Many citizens, as 
Oliver Houck writes, just wanted the government to “get them 
off their fucking roofs!”8
How had a governmental body failed so tremendously to 
protect a city as important as New Orleans? How had a levee 
system designed by the greatest engineers in the country simply 
failed? The answer was simple: in addition to its shoddy con-
struction and negligible maintenance, the system was designed to 
withstand a maximum Category 3 hurricane, but circumstances 
had changed.9 The natural wetland barriers of the Breton Sound 
and the Barataria Basin that the city once enjoyed have degener-
ated at an alarming pace.10 In their absence, massive hurricanes 
like Katrina are able to maintain their strength and their storm 
surges all the way to the doorsteps of the French Quarter.11
In response, the Corps spent $15 billion to upgrade and 
reinforce the levee and water control systems of New Orleans.12 
Bigger walls were built around the sinking bowl. The amount 
spent on the projects paled in comparison to the $120 billion 
in damage that Rita and Katrina had inflicted primarily upon 
America’s most unique city.13 Politicians, citizens, and governors 
all vowed never again.14 Accordingly, when Hurricane Isaac 
passed over the city like a creeping monster in late August of 
2012, New Orleans remained dry.15 Thirty miles west, the citi-
zens of Laplace bundled possessions and pets into small boats as 
Isaac’s waves devoured their homes.
For hundreds of years, the Mississippi River and the wet-
lands have, economically speaking, been a figurative printing 
press for Louisiana and the United States as a whole. However, 
in the past 25 years, Louisiana’s coast has lost an average of 
roughly seventeen square miles of land per year, or the equiva-
lent of a football field of land every hour.16 More important than 
the substantial economic benefits that the wetlands bestow upon 
Louisiana (e.g., seafood, energy, recreation, shipping and tour-
ism) is the vast physical barrier that they once played between 
ferocious Atlantic hurricanes and coastal communities.17 The 
wetlands reduce hurricane surge waters by one foot for every 
mile.18 With the wetlands diminishing at incredible rates and 
global climate change instigating more powerful storms and 
higher sea levels, communities like Laplace, Louisiana, are fac-
ing unprecedented devastation.19
During Hurricane Isaac, characterized as Category 1 by the 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (“NOAA”), 
Laplace was victim to flood waters higher than it had ever expe-
rienced before—higher than even those brought on by Hurricane 
Katrina.20 The difference in the seven years between Isaac and 
Katrina were 120 square miles of lost wetland barriers and a $15 
billion Corps effort to revamp and improve the water control 
structures of New Orleans just miles away.21 Essentially, Laplace 
fell victim to the decimation of its natural protective basins and 
floodwaters diverted from New Orleans as a result of the city’s 
post-Katrina flood control improvements. These two avoidable 
disasters were the cause of the worst flooding in the recorded 
history of the city of Laplace.22
Accordingly, this article proposes separate class action 
lawsuits and a litigation strategy for the affected members of 
the Laplace community (“Class”) against the Corps and the 
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Louisiana Department of Natural Resources (“LDNR”). A 
judicial mandate that the State, the LDNR, and the Corps take 
immediate action to restore and protect the wetland barriers of 
Southern Louisiana could effectuate the crucial action necessary 
to prevent the disasters of Katrina and Isaac from occurring once 
more. The Class will first assert a public-trust doctrine claim 
against the LDNR for: (1) failing to protect the natural resources 
of the Louisiana wetlands from decimation by diverting their 
fresh water sources and not using available Mississippi River 
diversionary structures; and (2) failing to meaningfully regulate 
the canalization of coastal Louisiana.
Furthermore, a second suit should be brought against the 
USACE: (1) contributing to the mass flooding in Laplace, 
Louisiana, during Hurricane Isaac, as the flood protection mech-
anisms surrounding the New Orleans area diverted water in to 
the communities of the southwest banks of Lake Pontchartrain, 
in violation of the Federal Tort Claims Act, and (2) failing to 
maintain the integrity of the Louisiana wetlands (described 
above) as required by federal public-trust doctrine. Had these 
issues been addressed prior to Hurricane Isaac, the flooding 
experienced in Laplace would not have occurred. 
Finally, the Louisiana public-trust doctrine should be 
permanently amended to include the State’s wetlands. The suc-
cess of the suit will force the Louisiana Department of Natural 
Resources and the Corps to revive coastal wetlands, and amend 
the water control structures of New Orleans so they do not 
flood the outlying communities of Lake Pontchartrain during 
hurricanes.
In advancing this proposal, Part II will provide information 
pertinent to understanding the geographic and social history of 
the Louisiana delta region by reviewing the impetus behind the 
Corps’s involvement in the region’s current environmental situ-
ation and the dire need for immediate action, as well as modern 
efforts at coastal restoration. Part III will describe the Class’s 
reliance upon the history of the public-trust doctrine to further 
its claims; namely, the State and Corps’s failure to maintain the 
wetlands under the obligations encompassed in the public-trust 
doctrine, as well as those claims to be brought under the Federal 
Tort Claims Act against the Corps. Part IV concludes this article.
II. where we are, how we GoT here,  
and why IT maTTers
A. Bienvenue en Louisiane
It was May of 2008 when I first crossed the I-10 bridges 
over lukewarm expanses of Lake Pontchartrain, en-route to a 
hazy cobalt sketch of New Orleans clambering towards the sky 
out of what seemed like endless ocean. I was on the phone with 
my sister in Dallas.
“So what does it look like?” 
“Dead Swamp Cypress in every direction. It’s like a 
graveyard for Earth.”
As I would later learn, the massive Bald Cypress forests 
around New Orleans were once part of the greater deltaic 
wetlands that had protected the city for hundreds of years.23 
However, saltwater intrusion caused by urban development, 
dredging, and the creation of navigation channels has increased 
the salinity of the Pontchartrain lakeshore past the habitable 
zone of the iconic trees.24 The effect: miles of stone-grey trunks 
standing in contrast to the vibrancy of the city that killed them.25
Figure 1. Wetland Loss in Southern Louisiana. Source: u.s. GeoloGIcAl survey, dePIcTInG coAsTAl louIsIAnA lAnd loss 2 (2005),  
available at http://www.nwrc.usgs.gov/factshts/2005-3101.pdf (areas colored in yellow are projected land losses by the year 2050).
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Contrary to its swift demise, the Louisiana delta region 
was built over a several-million-year period and is now the 
seventh largest delta on the planet.26 As with any deltaic region, 
ceaseless streams of sediment from continental North America 
bumble down the swift waters of the 
Mississippi River and are deposited 
where the mouth meets the Gulf 
of Mexico or, colloquially, “the 
Bathtub.”27 Essentially, after mil-
lions of years and unfathomable tons 
of sediment, the region known as 
Southern Louisiana was built from 
the compaction of these deposits.28
Although the loss of land in 
Louisiana is a “spanking new phe-
nomenon” in geologic terms, it can 
hardly be considered news by any 
stretch of the human conscience.29 
Coastal erosion in the state has 
been documented from at least the 
1930s.30 The question then arises: 
how could a state so inherently 
dependent upon its wetlands not act 
to prevent the environmental train 
wreck that Louisiana faces today? As 
Oliver Houck suggests, Louisiana’s relationship with its wetland 
resource “is similar to that of any organism with too much of 
a resource to bother about.”31 Simply put, most people never 
thought the wetlands would actually disappear.
Notably, the region is home to 37% of the nation’s estuarine 
habitats and accounts for the largest commercial fishing econ-
omy in the continental United States. 32 Prior to the 2005 hurri-
cane season, Louisiana was the source of one third of the United 
States’ seafood, and 20% of all U.S. energy passed through the 
ports of New Orleans and Baton Rouge.33 It is only obvious that 
the economy of Louisiana is inexorably and vitally linked to the 
health of the Mississippi River and its wetlands. However, to 
truly understand the positive impact that Louisiana’s waterways 
have had on its cultural and economic development, one must 
know the tempestuous, untamable nature of the Mississippi 
River.
1. The GreAT flood of 1927
In the spring of 1927, the residents of Arkansas, Illinois, 
Kentucky, Mississippi, Missouri, Tennessee, and Louisiana 
saw between six and eleven inches of rain poured upon the 
Mississippi River, and its banks swelled to unimaginable widths, 
creating unprecedented and catastrophic flood damage across 
incredible swaths of the country.34
Estimates of the Great Flood of 1927 (“Great Flood”) 
suggest that twenty-seven thousand square miles of land were 
inundated, “ruining crops, damaging or destroying 137,000 
buildings, causing 700,000 people to be displaced from their 
homes, and killing 250 individuals across the seven impacted 
states.”35 By July 1st, the Mississippi River had swelled to a 
width of 70 miles and covered an area of land equal to the size 
of Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Hampshire and Vermont 
combined.36 In today’s terms, a flood equal to that of the Great 
Flood would come with an economic damage bill of over $160 
billion—besting even Hurricane 
Katrina.37
When confronted with these 
numbers, it can come as no surprise 
that there was a significant and fun-
damental change to the way in which 
Americans viewed the Mississippi 
River, in addition to an equally signif-
icant shift in the political climate.38 
Indeed, the event was so scarring 
and impactful that the passage of the 
Flood Control Act of 1928 became 
of the utmost national importance, 
and the successful handling of flood 
relief efforts by Herbert Hoover all 
but guaranteed him the office of the 
thirty-first president.39
Given the economic necessity 
of the river and its use as a waterway 
for shipping, the Flood Control Act 
of 1928 took a very human-centered 
perspective on co-existence with nature by placing the planning 
and containment of the Mississippi River within the hands of 
the federal government.40 USACE was tasked with controlling 
and mitigating the flow of the fourth-longest river in the entire 
world.41 Little, if any, respect to the natural flow of the river was 
granted after this point. Like a prized stallion, the Mississippi 
had to be broken.
2. usAce And The dIsAPPeArInG sTATe
Under the new authority of the Flood Control Act of 
1928,42 the Corps set out immediately to design and construct 
an extensive network of dams, levees and water control struc-
tures in order to prevent another flood on the scale of the Great 
Flood. In furtherance of its divine destiny to control the mighty 
Mississippi, the Corps constructed an enormous 2,203 miles of 
levees43 running like twin ribbons along the banks of the river.44 
Over thousands of years, rivers naturally change their course, 
swinging back and forth across a landscape, giving them an 
aerial visage of a snake. However, as one might guess, the con-
struction of levees prevents this most basic function by blocking 
any natural movement in the river.45
Each major basin of the Louisiana delta was once the mouth 
of the Mississippi River.46 Indeed, over millions of years the river 
shifted back and forth between these massive wetlands, deposit-
ing the silt and sediment that eventually built the area known as 
Southern Louisiana.47 Since 2600 B.c.e., the Mississippi River 
has altered its major course four times.48 At the founding of 
New Orleans in 1718 by the French settlers Pierre Le Moyne 
d’Iberville and Jean-Baptiste Le Moyne de Bienville, the mouth 
of the Mississippi was located near the fated city, and its major 
“Contrary to its 
swift demise, the 
Louisiana delta 
region was built over 
a several-million-
year period and is 
now the seventh-
largest delta on the 
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distributary49 flowed in to the Atchafalaya Basin.50 However, 
nearly 300 years later, the river has, inevitably, shown a desire 
to shift primarily down this distributary, the Atchafalaya River, 
into the Atchafalaya Basin.51 The consequences of this shift 
away from New Orleans were not lost upon the politicians who 
controlled the purse strings of the Corps.52 Understanding the 
strategic economic importance of deep water for the Port of New 
Orleans, the Corps ensured that the Mississippi River would for-
ever flow directly to the city via this network of levees.
In addition to the levees, the Corps constructed a series 
of dams along the length of the river that reduced the overall 
output of sediment from over 1.5 million tons a day in 1951 to 
a little less than 500,000 tons per day.53 The damming of the 
Missouri River alone reduced contributions to the Mississippi 
River by 70-80%.54 The multitudinous dams on the river essen-
tially blocked the transport of vital sediment to the Louisiana 
wetlands. Without these sediments, the wetlands began to shrink 
and simply disappeared.
3. cAnAlIzATIon of coAsTAl louIsIAnA
Dr. William Platt and I were sitting in his office staring stoi-
cally upon the bands of a swirling giant in the Gulf. It was August 
30, 2008 in Baton Rouge, and mere hours before Hurricane 
Gustav was to make landfall. I got up to pace the room because 
it is unnerving to stare at a bullet you cannot stop.
“Dr. Bill, this roadmap on the wall, where is this?” 
“That’s not a roadmap. That’s the bayou, kiddo.”
Here in the swamps of Louisiana, they’ve experienced death 
by a thousand cuts.55 Any aerial image of the Louisiana wetlands 
will provide a shocking example of the many-thousand canals 
that have been dredged primarily to facilitate transportation for 
oil and gas sites.56 The canals intersect and weave mindlessly 
like the streets of an old European capital, like the ravines of a 
brain without any of the functioning. Today, these cuts disrupt 
hydrological flow and have the effect of eliminating all biologi-
cal cohesiveness in a very delicately balanced environment.57
The direct impacts of canal cutting are an immediate loss of 
land to dredging, tidal circulation disruption, and bank erosion 
as a result of the constant wake from boats that use the canals.58 
However, it is the indirect effects that are far more sinister. 
Research now shows that the cutting of a canal allows for saltwa-
ter intrusion into the heart of the bayou.59 As saltwater intrudes 
upon the open canals, the salinity of the surrounding brackish 
water increases to an uninhabitable point; grasses die and the 
entire process is aggravated.60
4. cAse sTudy: “mr. (no) Go”
A disastrous example of canalization in coastal Louisiana 
was the development of the Mississippi River Gulf Outlet 
(“MRGO”), or “Mr. Go.” Constructed by the Corps and opened 
in 1968, MRGO was a massive canal capable of streamlining 
freight shipments into the Port of New Orleans, rather than 
through the winding Mississippi River.61 The intent of the canal 
was the expedited movement of all shipping traffic through a 
straight-shot canal connecting the Gulf of Mexico and the inner 
harbor of New Orleans.62 Unfortunately, the Corps had not 
anticipated the intrusion of saltwater into their newest crown-
ing achievement.63 Although MRGO was originally dredged at 
approximately 600 feet, the introduction of salt water into the 
Figure 2. Canals in Southern Louisiana. Source: J.M. Allen, Louisiana’s Lost Wetlands (May 2011),  
http://www.atlantisbolivia.org/canalslouisiana1.htm.
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brackish water canal eroded the vegetation that held the canal 
together.64 As a result, MRGO widened to nearly 2,000 feet and 
became shallower, necessitating hugely expensive re-dredging 
efforts at the cost of about $20,000 per passing ship.65 If the 
expense of maintaining MRGO was not enough, the fiasco of 
Hurricane Katrina truly sealed its fate. As Hurricane Katrina 
approached New Orleans, MRGO acted as a direct pipeline for 
surge and floodwaters to funnel leisurely into the inner harbor of 
the city.66 After the tremendous disaster of Katrina, MRGO was 
officially closed by the Corps, citing a $130 million price tag for 
its repair.67
With disastrous projects such 
as MRGO surviving until the mid-
2000s—even against the opposition 
of thousands screaming like ban-
shees over its negative environmental 
impact68—one would assume that 
Louisianans have chosen instant 
gratification from commerce over 
long-term sustainability in the 
region. However, the efforts to restore 
coastal Louisiana are massing, albeit 
at a slow pace.
5. modern efforTs AT  
coAsTAl resTorATIon  
In louIsIAnA
I once spent a steaming sum-
mer weekend at the south end of 
Bayou Petit Caillou, near Cocodrie, 
Louisiana. It was the kind of hot that 
Southern writers hate to describe. Up 
to my shins in swamp mud, shoving 
plugs of marsh grass into the roiling 
puddles. Two years later, as I drove 
through the back half of Hurricane 
Isaac on my way from Houston to 
Baton Rouge, the wind slapped sprigs of a familiar grass against 
my windshield wipers. I could not help but think, “Did I plant 
you?”
In the 1990s, several Louisiana commissions and offices of 
the state released a cooperative plan gloriously labeled “Coast 
2050.”69 The massive report, hailed as a beacon of light for the 
blighted state, was a highly generalized report on how the state 
of Louisiana, hilariously, needed saving.70 The report echoed 
what scientists and researchers had been postulating and pub-
lishing for years. Plus, the bureaucratic structure of the Coast 
2050 plan led to inherent issues regarding effectiveness and 
response time.71 Although the plan was established almost 20 
years ago, the efforts have proven to do very little to save coastal 
Louisiana from ultimate destruction.72 The lack of effective-
ness with regard to the Coast 2050 plan can be overwhelmingly 
attributed to the intentional underutilization of the Mississippi 
River diversion structures at Caernarvon, Davis Pond, Bonnet 
Carré and Morganza.73
6. BITInG The feedInG hAnd: The dIversIons And  
TheIr BAsIns
The story of diversionary structures built along the 
Mississippi River in Southern Louisiana includes a lot of gilded 
lip service deep-fried in some ivory tower nonsense about 
restoring and saving over a million acres of precious wetlands.74 
Much to everyone’s shock, I am sure, these lofty ideals and res-
toration promises have been about as effective as an Alcoholics 
Anonymous© (“AA”) meeting on Bourbon Street. And, frankly, 
in the case of the Caernarvon Diversion Structure, the AA group 
leader was found blackout-wasted in 
Pat O’Brien’s® at two o’clock on a 
Tuesday afternoon.
The old dogs of the diversionary 
structures are the Bonnet Carré and 
the Morganza spillways.75 Opened 
in 1931 as a response to the Great 
Flood of 1927, the Bonnet Carré is 
a 350-bay spillway that allows for 
significant diversions of Mississippi 
River water into Lake Pontchartrain 
and the surrounding wetland basin 
during times of exceptionally high 
water.76 As a reminder, the wetlands 
of the Pontchartrain Basin are inte-
gral defenses against storm surges 
for the communities (e.g., Laplace) 
outside of the high-walled Crescent 
City.
In its riveting eighty-decade 
existence, the Bonnet Carré spillway 
has been opened a grand total of ten 
times at an average 87% capacity.77 
In addition to the infrequent open-
ings of the spillway which “ha[ve] 
an immediate, short-term, freshening 
effect,” the Corps proudly boasts that the spillway’s structure 
unintentionally leaks around 10,000 cubic feet of water per 
second once or twice per year,78 compared to the 250,000 cubic 
feet capability of an opening.79 Ignoring the blatant fact that the 
Bonnet Carré is only opened when New Orleans is threatened 
by river flooding and not for the express purpose of wetland 
restoration, as evidenced by the historical record,80 the Corps is 
essentially tossing a pirogue at the Titanic and calling it a rescue 
mission. Numbers do not lie, and since 1900 the wetlands of the 
Pontchartrain Basin have been reduced by 50% due to the lack 
of sediment deposits from freshwater—a monstrous issue that 
could have been solved via the Bonnet Carré spillway.81
The narrative of the Morganza Spillway, which feeds fresh-
water to the wetlands of the vitally important Atchafalaya Basin, 
is even more lackluster than the Bonnet Carré. Opened in 1954, 
the Morganza spillway has been utilized exactly two times: once 
in 1973, opening 42 of 125 bays,82 and again in 2011 when a 
mere 17 were opened.83 However, due to the existence of the 
Atchafalaya River and the small amounts of sediment that are 
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consistently fed to the basin naturally, the Atchafalaya Basin 
maintains the distinct honor of being the only moderately stable 
wetland basin in the entire state.84
Differing from the original flood control intent of the 
Bonnet Carré and Morganza, the Caernarvon and Davis Pond 
diversion structures were constructed for the express purpose of 
restoring wetlands and regulating salinity in the Breton Sound 
and Barataria Basins, respectively.85 At a cost of $26 million, the 
Caernarvon began operating in 1991 and was expected to restore 
sixteen thousand acres of coastal wetlands.86 Someone must 
have enjoyed one too many Hand Grenades®87 while devising 
this plan, because not only has there been significant continued 
wetland loss in the Breton Sound Basin following the opening 
of the Caernarvon, data shows that the losses are increasing.88 
Even in the areas close to the Caernarvon Diversion, where the 
impact of sediment deposition would be the greatest, the vegeta-
tion level is lower than when the diversion opened in 1991.89
Finally, the Davis Pond diversion structure was completed 
in 2001 at a cost of $120 million with the expectation of restor-
ing thirty-three thousand acres and benefitting seven hundred 
seventy-seven thousand acres of wetlands in the Barataria 
Basin.90 With a potential freshwater outflow of 10,650 cubic feet 
per second, the diversion structure has been underutilized at an 
average of less than half that capacity.91 At this rate of usage, 
the influx of freshwater is capable of merely maintaining the 
dwindling wetlands that are present in the Barataria Basin, but 
in its 12 years of operation, the restoration and wetland creation 
aspects have not come to fruition.92 One then might ask, where 
are the 33,000 acres of restored wetlands? USACE is currently 
discussing and formulating a plan to further open the Davis Pond 
structure in order to facilitate wetland growth.93 Unfortunately, 
the initial report, due in November 2013 upon the signature of 
the Chief of Engineers, has not released.94 After this momentous 
signing, the plan then has the distinct pleasure of going before 
Congress for approval.95
However, recent successes with freshwater diversion include 
wetlands restored near Venice, Louisiana, at West Bay and, albeit 
unintentionally, in the Pontchartrain Basin as a result of the 
Bonnet Carré opening that occurred during the 2011 flooding.96 
Despite the success of the West Bay restoration, where ten acres 
were restored in 2011 alone, navigation industry lobbyists were 
able to secure an order to close the diversion in 2008 in order 
to facilitate anchorage in the area.97 Fortunately, after a lengthy 
legal battle, proponents of the West Bay project won a reversal 
and a 10-year extension of operation in October of 2012.98
Although the economic, cultural, and environmental impor-
tance of the Louisiana wetlands has now been recognized, this 
understanding is something of a recent phenomenon.99 For hun-
dreds of years, the wetlands and bayous of the state were looked 
upon as nothing more than a cesspool for disease and dangerous 
animals.100 In fact, during the era of slavery, owners rarely, if 
ever, followed a runaway slave into the swamp, as they were 
likely to die anyway. In Twelve Years a Slave, Solomon Northrup 
recorded this reality when he escaped capture from his Louisiana 
master by fleeing into the Great Pacoudrie Swamp, evading water 
moccasins and alligators.101 Moreover, the swamps of Southern 
Louisiana have been drained and reclaimed since the early 1700s 
by French settlers in an effort to increase their land holds and 
reduce mosquito breeding grounds.102 Recognizing the historical 
love-hate relationship between Louisianans and their swamps, it 
can only be expected that the protection of a malaria-infested, 
alligator breeding ground would take decades of evolution and 
a judicial cognizance of its function, which could only come at 
a glacial pace.
B. The Public-Trust Doctrine
This section will discuss how the wetlands of Southern 
Louisiana eventually came under the protection of the Louisiana 
public-trust doctrine and, further, how the federal public-trust 
doctrine emerged as an interpretation of ancient Roman law. As 
a matter of course, the Laplace community will be required to 
prove that the aforementioned wetland basins are lands protected 
under the public trusts of the State of Louisiana and the United 
States. In establishing this fact, the Class must first emphasize 
the history of the public-trust doctrine and how modern juris-
prudence has included the Louisiana coastal wetlands within its 
bounds.
The first Western record of the public trust comes from the 
laws of Emperor Justinian of the Roman Empire, who ordered 
that the seas, rivers, air and seashores were the property of the 
people, could be owned by no single entity, and were held in 
the public trust.103 Later records of the public trust have also 
been found in Las Siete Partidas, Spanish laws from the time of 
Alfonso the Wise.104 The overarching intent of the public trust 
evolved under English common law to ensure the protection of 
the citizens’ natural resources by the government so that present 
and future generations might also reap their benefits.105
Borrowing from the English common law, the United 
States effectuated its own federal public-trust doctrine, which is 
mandated over each of the 50 states under the authority of the 
Supremacy Clause.106 However, many states have expounded 
upon the original federal public-trust doctrine and tailored spe-
cific legislation to protect those geographic features particular to 
their borders.107 Judicial interpretation of the public-trust doc-
trine more or less begins with the landmark case Illinois Central 
Railroad Company v. State of Illinois.108
1. federAl And sTATe InTerPreTATIon of The docTrIne
In 1851, the City of Chicago granted the Illinois Central 
Railroad the rights to construct a north-south railroad along 3 
million acres of Lake Michigan shoreline and, later, 1,000 acres 
of land submerged under Lake Michigan via the Lake Front 
Act of 1869 in exchange for the construction of a breakwater 
to protect the harbor of Chicago from siltation.109 Siltation is 
the pollution of water by fine particulate terrestrial material, 
which can eventually make a harbor shallow and unusable.110 
Following public opposition and an extensive legal battle, the 
Supreme Court of the United States ultimately invalidated the 
agreement finding that the right to lands held in the public trust 
cannot be sold, bought, or relinquished in any way.111 The Court 
held that each state has an inalienable right and ownership of all 
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lands submerged below water and designated as navigable water 
within their state, noting a departure from the English “ebb and 
tide” rule.112
The public-trust doctrine was interpreted again in 1988 
by the Supreme Court in Phillips Petroleum Company v. 
Mississippi,113 where the Petitioner brought a claim of owner-
ship against the State for 42 acres of land underlying a bayou 
and several streams. Although the doctrine had historically been 
interpreted to apply only to those navigable waters of the United 
States, the Court departed from this tradition in finding that 
“States have interests in lands beneath tidal waters which have 
nothing to do with navigation,” and, as such, wetlands, bayous, 
and streams incident to the Mississippi River fall within the 
public trust.114
In 1983, the National Audubon Society sued the Los 
Angeles Department of Water and Power to enjoin it from further 
draining and degrading Mono Lake, which the plaintiffs argued 
fell under the protection of the state public-trust doctrine.115 
In finding that Mono Lake did fall under the protection of the 
public-trust doctrine, the Supreme Court of California held that:
The lake’s recession obviously diminishes its value 
as an economic, recreational, and scenic resource. 
. . . The declining shrimp hatch depresses a local 
shrimping industry. . . . Mono Lake has long been 
treasured as a unique scenic, recreational and scien-
tific resource, but continued diversions threaten to 
turn it into a desert wasteland like the dry bed of 
Owens Lake.116
The decision in National Audubon Society was immensely 
important because the Court imposed a duty upon the State to 
place substantial consideration upon the economic vitality, natu-
ral health, and scenic importance of the lake before allocating 
water from its reserves.117 Similarly, in Citizens for Responsible 
Wildlife Management v. State, where 12 organizations sued the 
state of Washington challenging bans on certain trapping mecha-
nisms for wildlife, the Court found that the legislation enacted 
was necessary under Washington’s obligation to protect the 
natural resources of the people, i.e., wildlife.118 The lack of such 
legislation could effectuate neglect on the part of the State with 
regard to their directives under the public-trust doctrine.119
2. louIsIAnA InTerPreTATIon of The  
PuBlIc-TrusT docTrIne
Although the Louisiana public-trust doctrine has long 
included those waterways that are navigable by nature (e.g., 
rivers, lakes, inland bays), the inclusion of the State’s wetlands 
within the doctrine was, at best, murky until some clarity was 
provided from the 2004 decision in Avenal v. Louisiana.120 Prior 
to that ruling, in 1984, environmental protection of the coastal 
wetlands garnered a slight victory in Save Ourselves, Inc. v. 
Louisiana Environmental Control Commission,121 when the 
Court found that the “Constitution imposes a duty of environ-
mental protection on all state agencies and officials, establishes 
a standard of environmental protection, and mandates the legis-
lature to enact laws to implement fully this policy.”122 However, 
many scholars felt that the holding did not reach far enough in 
guaranteeing the protection of coastal wetlands, as the clever 
litigant could still maneuver the Court’s balancing test in favor 
of environmentally harmful actions.123
3. GAme chAnGer: avenaL v. Louisiana
In 1994, affected class members, including oyster fishermen 
and lease holders in the Breton Sound Basin, brought suit against 
the LDNR to recover for alleged unconstitutional takings of their 
fishing grounds and leaseholds.124 As previously described in 
this article, the Caernarvon Diversion Structure was constructed 
in 1991 and activated for the purpose of introducing freshwa-
ter and sediment into the Breton Sound as a coastal restoration 
project.125 However, the influx of freshwater altered the salinity 
of the oyster beds in small areas of the Breton Sound, negatively 
affecting the various businesses of the class members.126 In its 
monumental holding, the Court found that the implementation 
of the Caernarvon Diversion structure for purposes of coastal 
restoration fit entirely within the scope of the State’s duties under 
the public-trust doctrine and, thus, did not amount to an uncon-
stitutional taking.127 The Court found that the natural resource 
at issue was Louisiana’s rapidly receding coastal wetlands and 
that the “risks involved are not just environmental, but involve 
the health, safety, and welfare” of southern Louisiana, which is 
threatened by hurricanes and a shrinking coastal barrier.128
The problem before the people of Louisiana is clearer now 
than ever before. Our state is disappearing at a pace unrivaled by 
any period of American history and with it goes an entire way 
of life. Small, respectable efforts at restoration have been suc-
cessful to an extent, but they have merely placed fingers in the 
cracks of a faltering dam. Fundamental and robust action must 
be taken by the only entities capable of protecting the citizens 
of Louisiana: the state legislature and USACE. Unfortunately, 
it has become exceedingly apparent that the state and USACE 
do not have the time for scholarly insight or scientific recom-
mendation regarding climate change and the rapidly shrinking 
wetlands. Thus, the only remaining avenue of recourse for the 
people of Louisiana has become the court.
III. laPlace’s claIms under The PublIc-TrusT 
docTrIne and The Federal TorT claIms acT
This section will begin by describing the Class, its central 
intent of the litigation and the common interests that it shares, 
as well as the various courts in which the suits will be filed. 
Additionally, as the argument of the Class will be entirely simi-
lar in both cases with regard to the public-trust doctrine claims, 
this section will combine the legal analysis instead of addressing 
them at both the federal and state levels. Finally, the claims to be 
brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act against the Corps will 
be discussed and further elucidated.
A. Contours of the Class
The central intent and common interest of the separate 
Laplace class action suits against the state of LDNR (Office 
of Coastal Management) and the Corps (“Defendants”) will 
be wholly the same: to effectuate the forced restoration and 
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reclamation of the wetland barriers in the Barataria, Breton 
Sound, Pontchartrain, and Atchafalaya Basins, so as to mitigate 
or prevent future flood disasters similar to those experienced in 
Hurricanes Katrina and Isaac.
In compliance with the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 23(c)(1)(B) and Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure 
Article 591 (“Article 591”),129 in order to bring a class action 
suit, it must be shown that: (1) the class is so numerous that 
joinder of all members is impracticable; (2) there are questions 
of law or fact common to the class; (3) the claims or defenses of 
the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses 
of the class; and (4) the representative parties will fairly and 
adequately protect the interests of the class.130
In the present case, the joinder of thousands of affected indi-
viduals from the Laplace community would be the definition of 
impracticable, and therefore, the description of those eligible for 
the “Class” will be defined as the following: Any member of the 
Laplace, Louisiana, community who suffered physical harm to 
their persons or property as a direct result of the flooding or high 
water during Hurricane Isaac. The Class will assert that they 
have common interest in the maintenance of the State’s natural 
wetlands for physical protection of their, inter alia, businesses, 
homes, and families against the ancient threat of hurricanes from 
the Gulf of Mexico and sea-level rise. Furthermore, the Class 
will assert that it has common claims against the Defendants; 
specifically, that the State of Louisiana and USACE negligently 
failed to maintain the integrity and vitality of the wetlands as 
required by their obligations set forth within the Louisiana and 
federal public-trust doctrines. As such, the health, safety, and 
economic interests of the citizens of Louisiana and the Class 
have been placed in continued, serious danger.
In the first action, the affected members of the Laplace 
community (“Class”) should file suit in the 40th Judicial District 
Court for St. John the Baptist Parish located in Edgard, Louisiana 
pursuant to Article 591. The Class should seek a judicial man-
date that the State of Louisiana and the Department of Natural 
Resources (Office of Coastal Management): (1) substantially 
lobby the Corps for utilization of the available, and construction 
of additional, diversionary structures, in accordance with the 
State’s obligation set forth by the Louisiana public-trust doctrine; 
(2) mitigate future wetland loss by restoring and reclaiming inac-
tive industrial canals; and (3) permanently amend the Louisiana 
public-trust doctrine to include wetlands within its language.131
In the second suit, the Class should file suit pursuant to 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23,132 in the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana, located 
in New Orleans, seeking a judicial mandate that the USACE: 
(1) substantially utilize the available diversionary structures 
at Davis Pond, Morganza, Bonnet Carré and Caernarvon in 
accordance with the Corps’ obligation set forth by the federal 
public-trust doctrine; and (2) devise and construct flood control 
mechanisms to deter future flooding in the outer lying communi-
ties of New Orleans.
B. The Attack
The fundamental legal basis for the Class’s claims will be 
based upon federal jurisprudence in the area of the public-trust 
doctrine, as well as Article IX of the Louisiana Constitution, 
which states in pertinent part:
The natural resources of the state, including air 
and water, and the healthful, scenic, historic, 
and esthetic quality of the environment shall be 
protected, conserved, and replenished insofar as 
possible and consistent with the health, safety, and 
welfare of the people. The legislature shall enact 
laws to implement this policy.
. . .
The legislature shall neither alienate nor authorize 
the alienation of the bed of a navigable water body, 
except for purposes of reclamation by the riparian 
owner to recover land lost through erosion. This 
Section shall not prevent the leasing of state lands or 
water bottoms for mineral or other purposes. Except 
as provided in this Section, the bed of a navigable 
water body may be reclaimed only for public use.133
Louisiana and the Corps have long maintained the capa-
bility of effectuating wetland restoration but have negligently 
failed to implement the reasonable measures at their disposal.134 
In fact, the very regulations prescribing USACE’s policies and 
procedures in carrying out water control management activities 
compel the Corps:
. . . to insure that all water impounding structures 
are operated for the safety of users of the facilities 
and the general public. Care will be exercised in 
the development of reservoir regulation schedules 
to assure that controlled releases minimize project 
impacts and do not jeopardize the safety of persons 
engaged in activities downstream of the facility. 
Water control plans will include provisions for 
issuing adequate warnings or otherwise alerting all 
affected interests to possible hazards from project 
regulation activities.135
This state and federal negligence has left the people of 
Southern Louisiana in exponentially increasing danger as the 
natural barriers between their homes, businesses, families and 
cultural heritage have eroded due to three factors: (1) the inac-
tion of the State and LDNR by not issuing a firm recommenda-
tion to the Corps to open extensively the diversion structures to 
facilitate wetland growth; (2) the systematic blocking of every 
major conduit and distributary of the Mississippi River, via 
levees and diversion structures; and (3) the failure to meaning-
fully regulate canalization and mitigate its destructive effects. 
As such, the Defendants have substantially impaired sediment 
deposition within the wetlands in order to maintain the Port of 
New Orleans, thereby placing the interests of commerce and 
industry over the sanctity and value of human life.
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The Defendants will undoubtedly argue that the release of 
freshwater necessary to rehabilitate and reclaim lost wetlands 
through the diversionary structures would completely occupy 
the leaseholds of hundreds of fishermen and businessmen who 
currently do business within the aforementioned basins, thereby 
committing an unconstitutional taking under Article I, § 4 of the 
Lousiana Constitution136 and the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution.137 In its defense, the Defendants will rely upon the 
October 2012 Supreme Court ruling in Arkansas Game and Fish 
Commission v. United States, which held:
We rule today, simply and only, that government 
induced flooding temporary in duration gains no 
automatic exemption from Takings Clause inspec-
tion. When regulation or temporary physical inva-
sion by government interferes with private property, 
our decisions recognize, time is indeed a factor in 
determining the existence vel non of a compensable 
taking.138
However, the case sub judice is markedly different from 
that of Arkansas Game and Fish Commission, where the Corps 
flooded a swath of forest that “damaged or destroyed more 
than 18 million board feet of timber and disrupted the ordinary 
use and enjoyment of the Commission’s property.”139 Unlike 
the Corps’ flood control intent in Arkansas Game and Fish 
Commission, the Corps will be mandated to release freshwater 
upon those leaseholds and property interests in the basins for the 
purpose of wetlands restoration, an imperative mandated in its 
duty under the Federal and Louisiana public-trust doctrines.140 
Additionally, in anticipation of this argument, the Class will 
refer to the Louisiana Supreme Court’s decision in Avenal and 
Article IX of the Lousiana Constitution, each stating that the 
basins are the sole property of the State and, thus, immune from 
unconstitutional takings claims.141
Relying upon the Louisiana public-trust doctrine and its 
jurisprudential interpretation, the Class can successfully secure 
a mandate from the Court for the substantial opening of the 
diversion structures at Davis Pond, Caernarvon, Bonnet Carré 
and Morganza. Indeed, the basins clearly fall within the scope of 
those protected lands, as they secure substantial economic ben-
efits and protect the “health, safety, and welfare of our people, 
as coastal erosion removes an important barrier between large 
populations and ever-threatening hurricanes.”142
C. Claims Under the Federal Tort Claims Act against 
the USACE
The Class will pursue a second claim against the United 
States (i.e., USACE) under the Federal Tort Claims Act 
(“FTCA”)143 for an unconstitutional taking and destruction of 
their property when the flood control measures built around New 
Orleans diverted floodwaters from Hurricane Isaac into the com-
munity of Laplace, Louisiana.
In furtherance of the claim, the Class will distinguish 
the present case from that of In re Katrina Canal Breaches 
Litigation,144 where multiple citizens who lost homes or expe-
rienced severe property damage filed a class action suit against 
the Corps for negligently maintaining MRGO and failing to 
construct adequate levees.145 In that case, the plaintiffs claimed 
that MRGO acted as a flood conduit during Hurricane Katrina 
and that water was essentially funneled into their homes in 
St. Bernard Parish, the Lower Ninth Ward, and Chalmette.146 
However, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit found that 
the Corps was immune from litigation under the discretionary 
function exception of the FTCA.147 The Court further held that 
the government could not be held liable for damage caused by the 
faulty levees because they were constructed as a discretionary 
decision to protect the citizens of New Orleans.148 Essentially, 
the Court concludes that the government cannot be held liable 
for trying its best to protect citizens from disaster.
In the present case, the United States will likely assert that it 
has this same immunity under the pertinent FTCA section, stat-
ing that the design of the improvements around New Orleans 
were made in the interest of the general public and that the 
designs were not scientifically faulty.149 However, the Laplace 
litigation is far different from that of In re Katrina, because the 
improvements that diverted water into the Laplace community 
were designated and designed primarily for the City of New 
Orleans, not the citizens of Laplace. Unlike In re Katrina, there 
were no discretionary decisions made by the Corps regarding 
the flood protections of Laplace other than not to protect the city 
at all.
If the State and the Corps had done sufficient analysis 
of potential hurricanes, they would have discovered that the 
improvements made upon the levee and flood control systems 
of the city would divert large amounts of water to those commu-
nities outside its protection, as well as further degenerate those 
natural barriers that the outer lying cities do possess. Therefore, 
these water control structures are at least contributorily respon-
sible for the flooding that occurred in Laplace during Hurricane 
Isaac in August of 2012.
D. A Challenge to Succeeding and How the Class 
will Prevail
In November of 2012, the Corps released a report labeled 
Hurricane Isaac With and Without 2012 100-Year Evaluation. 
The report states:
[T]here were only a few places that the old system 
would have been overtopped during Hurricane 
Isaac; thus the old system would have displaced 
about the same amount of water as the new sys-
tem and the HSDRRS [Hurricane & Storm Risk 
Reduction System] could not have significantly 
influenced inundation at communities external to 
the system.150
However, if the report is correct and the improvements did 
not increase or create flooding by directing additional water into 
the Laplace community, this does not preclude two additional 
scenarios that the Class will pursue in court: (1) that the water 
control structures in existence prior to the improvements were 
already directing flooding waters into the Laplace community; 
and (2) that the water control structures are damaging the natural 
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barriers around the 
Laplace community, 
thereby indirectly induc-
ing flooding.151 In fact, 
the data released by the 
Corps only compares 
the flood level esti-
mates at various points 
in the New Orleans 
Metropolitan area in 
pre- and post-improvement terms.152 There remains the possibil-
ity that the original water control structures (those existent in 
2005) were already funneling floodwater into the surrounding 
region. Additionally, the Corps has a rather famous track record 
of dodging blame with regard to disastrous projects along the 
Mississippi River in Louisiana.153 In fact, in August of 2012, the 
commanding general of the Corps in post-Katrina New Orleans 
admitted in a Times-
Picayune interview 
that when he publicly 
blamed the flooding on 
city officials in 2006, 
he was relying entirely 
upon things he had 
heard and not on any 
scientif ic or reliable 
evidence.154
Iv. a TIred sTory and a new hoPe
I’m sitting in Zotz, a coffee shop straddling the Uptown and 
Leonidas neighborhoods of New Orleans, when she asks me, 
“So what was the most difficult part about writing your article?” 
I look away and stare at the words floating stoically on my com-
puter screen, “I cannot help but feel as if I’m writing a eulogy for 
my home. For my people.”
Figure 3. Hurricane Isaac High Water Marks. Source: Dan Swenson & Mark Schleifstein, Blame Hurricane 
Isaac, Not Post-Katrina Levee System, for high sure, Corps says, TImes-PIcAyune, Nov. 12, 2012,  
http://media.nola.com/environment/photo/map-isaacsurge-111212jpg-af6a43422c34fce8.jpg.
“The time to act in order  
to save Louisiana’s dwindling 
coastal wetlands was  
30 years ago.”
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With every letter that I press into the recesses of this key-
board there is a sinking that echoes the loss of Louisiana—60,000 
characters remind me why this isn’t a simple cause célèbre. This 
is not another Kony155 sensation splashed across every corner of 
the Internet for a burning moment. As Southern Louisiana sinks 
into the Gulf, so does a culture unlike any other in this world.
I realize that my finger was holding down the shift key when 
she asks me if there is any hope for this place. As I remove my 
finger, I feel the rise below. I look up at her and nod, “Yes.”
* * *
The time to act in order to save Louisiana’s dwindling 
coastal wetlands was 30 years ago. The gut-wrenching truth is 
that scholars, such as Oliver Houck, have been recommending, 
then heavily suggesting, then screaming, and now are groveling 
for action by the State of Louisiana and the U.S. Army Corps 
of Engineers. Although the efforts to save the State have begun 
to trickle in, gains are slow, and many are disillusioned or con-
vinced that the point of no return happened sometime around 
Katrina.
However, Harriet Beecher Stowe once wrote, “Never give 
up then, for that’s just the place and time that the tide’ll turn.”156 
The citizens of Laplace, Louisiana, have the distinct opportunity 
to hold off the oppressive tide of the Gulf of Mexico. Through 
organizing and filing a class action suit against the State of 
Louisiana, the Department of Natural Resources, and the U.S. 
Army Corps of Engineers based upon the public-trust doctrine 
and the Federal Tort Claims Act, a tiny town of Louisianans 
might incite change that will alter the face of a continent. 
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